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 A Bismarckian Moment: 
Charkaoui and Bill C-3 
Craig Forcese and Lorne Waldman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The German statesman Otto von Bismarck once said that “[i]f you 
like laws and sausages, you should never watch either one being made.”1 
The recent enactment of Bill C-32 — the government’s response to the 
Supreme Court’s February 2007 decision in Charkaoui v. Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration)3 — can best be described as a 
“Bismarckian moment”. An effort to remedy the core defects of the prior 
immigration security certificate regime, the new law cobbles together a 
potentially half-hearted “special advocate” regime and converts 
immigration law into a de facto system of indefinite limits on liberty for 
foreigners. The new system will generate an inevitable series of new 
constitutional challenges, some of which may succeed at the Supreme 
Court unless the deficiencies of Bill C-3 are cured by careful innovation 
at the Federal Court level. 
As discussed more fully in Kent Roach’s article in this volume,4 this 
Bill C-3 experience prompts observations about the true workings of the 
“dialogue” between courts and political branches on matters of 
                                                                                                             
*
  Craig Forcese, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa, 
cforcese@uottawa.ca. Lorne Waldman, Barrister & Solicitor, Waldman & Associates. We would 
like to thank Pam Anderson, LL.M. candidate at the University of Ottawa, for her research 
assistance on this article. Craig Forcese would also like to thank the Social Science Humanities 
Research Council and the Law Foundation of Ontario for their support of his research activities. 
1
  Suzy Platt, ed., Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations (Washington D.C.: 
Library of Congress, 1989), online: <http://www.bartleby.com/73/996.html>.  
2
  An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (certificate and special 
advocate), S.C. 2008, c. 3. 
3
  [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.). 
4
  Kent Roach, “Charkaoui and Bill C-3: Some Implications for Anti-Terrorism Policy and 
Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 281. 
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constitutional law,5 a concept espoused in the case law most famously in 
Vriend v. Alberta.6 In Vriend, the Court observed that:  
In reviewing legislative enactments and executive decisions to ensure 
constitutional validity, the courts speak to the legislative and executive 
branches. As has been pointed out, most of the legislation held not to 
pass constitutional muster has been followed by new legislation 
designed to accomplish similar objectives. … By doing this, the 
legislature responds to the courts; hence the dialogue among the 
branches.7  
In principle, the result is greater accountability because the work of each 
branch is reviewed by the other. This dialogue and enhanced 
accountability “have the effect of enhancing the democratic process, not 
denying it”.8 
Critics have sometimes rejected this assessment. They envisage the 
so-called dialogue between courts and legislatures as a monologue 
because judicial opinions give political credence to one policy position 
on an issue, lending the advantages of political inertia to that group. 
After courts have spoken, polarized political institutions find it easier to 
abdicate responsibility than to step to the plate again.9 
The Bill C-3 experience reflects a more nuanced dialogue than this 
critique implies. The Supreme Court’s reasoning did colour the response 
of the political branches of government, but not in the deterministic way 
envisaged by the dialogue theory critique. Charkaoui presented a menu 
of alternatives, not a fixed road-map leading inexorably to one 
conclusion. However, political actors construed these options in manners 
that suited their political needs or preferences, occasionally deploying 
the time limits imposed by that decision to negate dissent or to create a 
climate of crisis. The result is a law that while reacting to Charkaoui is 
best described as minimally responsive; that is, it creates a reformed 
system that does as little as possible (and perhaps too little) to respond to 
the constitutional complaint animating critiques of the prior regime. 
Along the way, it undertakes selective revisions of the security 
certificate regime that set up a next generation of constitutional 
                                                                                                             
5
  For the exploration of a “dialogue” theory, see, most notably, Peter Hogg & Allison 
Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75. 
6
  [1998] S.C.J. No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (S.C.C.). 
7
  Id., at 565. 
8
  Id., at 566. 
9
  F.L. Morton, “Dialogue or Monologue”, in Paul Howe & Peter Russell, eds., Judicial 
Power and Canadian Democracy (Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001). 
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challenges. Bill C-3 is, in other words, an awkward political concoction 
that risks new constitutional “train-wrecks” while only nominally 
cleaning up the last one. 
The article that follows explores these contentions. Unusually for an 
academic paper, it begins with a disclosure. One of the authors was 
involved in Charkaoui as counsel for an intervenor. Both authors then 
co-wrote a study on comparative “special advocate” models10 and, on 
that basis, were actively involved in the legislative process surrounding 
Bill C-3 as witnesses before parliamentary committees, and through 
discussions with parliamentarians and parliamentary staff and officials in 
the executive branch of government. One of us has now been named a 
special advocate, and both of us remain involved in one capacity or 
another in the development of the special advocate process. Put another 
way, we have been analysts, witnesses and protagonists in respect to the 
matters addressed in this article. In this paper, we assess the outcome of 
the Bill C-3 experience through an academic lens in order to provide an 
unofficial “legislative history” of this law-project. The manner in which 
we proceed is, however, inevitably affected by (and reflects) our 
proximity to the law-making process.  
We undertake this project in four core sections. Part II of this article 
provides a brief overview of the immigration security certificate regime 
and the core Charkaoui holding on the question of fair hearings. Part III 
canvasses the various models of “special counsel” the Supreme Court 
suggested might satisfy constitutional requirements under section 1 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.11 Part IV examines the 
policy and political environment in which Bill C-3 was then developed, 
the nature of Bill C-3’s response to the core findings of the Charkaoui 
decision and the law-making process in Parliament. Part V then turns to 
other features of Bill C-3, noting both changes that will likely prove 
important and other areas that will likely create new controversies. 
The article concludes that Bill C-3 represents an unsatisfactory 
waypoint in — rather than an ultimate culmination of — protracted 
constitutional debates over security certificates.  
                                                                                                             
10
  Craig Forcese & Lorne Waldman, Seeking Justice in an Unfair Process: Lessons from 
Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand on the Use of “Special Advocates” in National 
Security Proceedings (Study commissioned by the Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security 
Studies, with the financial support of the Courts Administration Service) (August 2007), online: 
<http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~cforcese/other/sastudy.pdf> [hereinafter “Seeking Justice”].  
11
  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.) 
1982, c. 11. 
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II. SECURITY CERTIFICATES AND THE CHARKAOUI DECISION 
1. Security Certificates in Brief 
Under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,12 the Federal 
Court of Canada reviews “security certificates” issued by the Minister of 
Immigration and the Minister of Public Safety. These certificates are 
linked to the detention and, where adjudged reasonable by a Federal 
Court judge, the potential removal of a named person.13 Where the 
security concerns are grave enough, IRPA purports to authorize the 
removal of the named person even if he or she is at risk of torture or 
other maltreatment in the receiving state, after the government balances 
the risk to the named person against the risk the person poses to 
Canada’s national security.14 In the Federal Court proceeding, the person 
subject to the certificate receives only a summary of the secret 
information produced by the government in support of the certificate.  
As the section that follows describes, the resulting inability of the 
named person to know the case to be met and contest the government’s 
allegations has fuelled substantial controversy in and outside of the 
courtroom, and ultimately sparked the Charkaoui decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada. 
2.  The Opportunity to Meet the Case and Security Certificates 
(a)  Practice in the Federal Court 
In March 2002, Hugessen J. of the Federal Court publicly 
complained that the IRPA security certificate procedures make judges “a 
little bit like a fig leaf”.  
We do not like this process of having to sit alone hearing only one 
party and looking at the materials produced by only one party and 
having to try to figure out for ourselves what is wrong with the case 
that is being presented before us and having to try for ourselves to see 
how the witnesses that appear before us ought to be cross-examined … 
We greatly miss, in short, our security blanket which is the adversary 
system that we were all brought up with and that … is for most of us, 
                                                                                                             
12
  S.C. 2001, c. 27 [hereinafter “IRPA”]. 
13
  By “named person”, this article means the person subject to the security certificate. 
14
  See discussion on this point below in Part IV. 
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the real warranty that the outcome of what we do is going to be fair and 
just. 
He proposed “some sort of system somewhat like the public defender 
system where some lawyers were mandated to have full access to the 
CSIS files, the underlying files, and to present whatever case they could 
against the granting of the relief sought”.15 
Justice Hugessen’s views did not, however, affect the jurisprudence 
of the Federal Court on full answer and defence in security certificate 
proceedings. For instance, the Federal Court of Appeal, in the Charkaoui 
case, was sympathetic to the difficulties the IRPA ex parte process 
produces, noting “[t]here is no doubt that the system, as it exists, 
complicates the task of the designated judge who must, in the absence of 
an applicant and his counsel, concern himself with the latter’s interests 
in order to give equal treatment to the parties before him”.16 Yet, the 
Court of Appeal held that it was for Parliament to set up such a system, 
not for the courts to demand it as part of minimal constitutional 
guarantees.17 Similar views had been expressed by the Federal Court in 
other IRPA national security certificate cases.18 Up until 2007, the 
Federal Court had addressed concerns about the ex parte nature of 
proceedings by adopting a pseudo-inquisitorial style in an effort to probe 
the government evidence.19 
(b)  The Charkaoui Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada 
The Supreme Court in Charkaoui took a very different approach, 
concluding that this Federal Court’s effort to resuscitate something 
approximating an adversarial system was inadequate.20 In a passage 
                                                                                                             
15
  Justice Hugessen, at a March 2002 conference held at the Canadian Institute for the 
Administration of Justice entitled “Terrorism, Law and Democracy”, reproduced in James K. 
Hugessen, “Watching the Watchers: Democratic Oversight” in D. Daubney et. al., eds., Terrorism, 
Law and Democracy: How is Canada changing following September 11? (Montreal: Canadian 
Institute for the Administration of Justice, 2002) 381, at 384. 
16
  Re Charkaoui, [2004] F.C.J. No. 2060, 2004 FCA 421, at para. 124 (F.C.A.).  
17
  Id., at paras. 121-26.  
18
  Re Harkat, [2004] F.C.J. No. 2101, 2004 FC 1717, at para. 43 et seq. (F.C.); Mahjoub v. 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] F.C.J. No. 173, 2005 FC 156, at para. 62 
(F.C.). 
19
  See Re Harkat, [2005] F.C.J. No. 481, 2005 FC 393, at para. 93 et seq. 
20
  Charkaoui, supra, note 3, at para. 51 (“The judge is not afforded the power to 
independently investigate all relevant facts that true inquisitorial judges enjoy. At the same time, 
since the named person is not given a full picture of the case to meet, the judge cannot rely on the 
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worthy of citation in full, the Court noted the deficiencies of the IRPA 
system: 
The judge, working under the constraints imposed by the IRPA, simply 
cannot fill the vacuum left by the removal of the traditional guarantees 
of a fair hearing. The judge sees only what the ministers put before him 
or her. The judge, knowing nothing else about the case, is not in a 
position to identify errors, find omissions or assess the credibility and 
truthfulness of the information in the way the named person would be. 
Although the judge may ask questions of the named person when the 
hearing is reopened, the judge is prevented from asking questions that 
might disclose the protected information. Likewise, since the named 
person does not know what has been put against him or her, he or she 
does not know what the designated judge needs to hear. If the judge 
cannot provide the named person with a summary of the information 
that is sufficient to enable the person to know the case to meet, then the 
judge cannot be satisfied that the information before him or her is 
sufficient or reliable. Despite the judge’s best efforts to question the 
government’s witnesses and scrutinize the documentary evidence, he 
or she is placed in the situation of asking questions and ultimately 
deciding the issues on the basis of incomplete and potentially 
unreliable information.21 
For these reasons, the IRPA secrecy rules violated section 7. They also 
violated section 1; the government had shown no reason why it had 
failed to adopt some sort of model in which an independent “special 
counsel” represented the interests of named person in the ex parte 
proceedings. In the absence of such a counsel, the security certificate 
system could not be viewed as minimally impairing of the section 7 
right.  
III. A MENU OF MINIMALLY IMPAIRING ALTERNATIVES 
This holding on special counsel constituted the single most 
important finding of the Court, one that would inform most of what 
followed in Bill C-3. It is important, therefore, to review closely the 
Supreme Court’s deliberations on this issue. 
Critically, in the course of its decision, the Court canvassed a 
number of different special counsel options, but without expressing a 
                                                                                                             
parties to present missing evidence. The result is that, at the end of the day, one cannot be sure that 
the judge has been exposed to the whole factual picture”). 
21
  Id., at para. 63. 
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preference between these alternatives. Indeed, it expressly left it to 
Parliament to decide “what more should be done”.22 These alternatives 
were (in the order in which they appeared): the Security Intelligence 
Review Committee (“SIRC”) process; the Air India trial process; the 
Arar Commission process; and the United Kingdom system of special 
advocates. It also discussed the approach taken by the Canada Evidence 
Act23 in the disclosure of information said to raise national security 
issues. This Part examines the SIRC and U.K. approaches, the two 
models with a standing, institutional structure.24  
Our discussion of the SIRC and U.K. approaches includes 
information drawn both from published material, duly cited. In other 
instances, however, our information is from primary sources; that is, 
drawn from a series of interviews conducted in the summer of 2007 with 
Canadian and U.K. barristers involved in the SIRC and special advocate 
systems.25 
1.  Security Intelligence Review Committee  
SIRC is a body of often prominent individuals appointed by the 
Governor-in-Council (after consultation with the leaders of official 
parties in the Commons) to review the Canadian Security and 
Intelligence Service (“CSIS”), Canada’s security intelligence agency.26 
In performing its functions, SIRC has two roles: to review the activities 
of CSIS and to investigate complaints against CSIS. In relation to the 
latter function, the most generic complaint concerns “any act or thing 
done by the Service”.27  
                                                                                                             
22
  Id., at para. 87. 
23
  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5. 
24
  For an excellent discussion of, inter alia, the Air India trial and Arar Commission 
approach, see Roach, supra, note 4. 
25
  These conversations consisted of telephone interviews and two London, U.K. 
roundtables conducted during the summer of 2007 with over a dozen special advocates, the U.K. 
Special Advocates Support Office and several United Kingdom defence counsel and civil society 
organizations as well as persons associated with the SIRC process. The interviews were conducted 
on the understanding that while the information obtained in them could be used freely, specific 
views would not be attributed to individuals (except with their consent). For a fuller discussion of 
the outcome of this research study, please see Seeking Justice, supra, note 10. 
26
  Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-23, s. 38 [hereinafter 
“CSIS Act”]. 
27
  Id., s. 41. SIRC also investigates complaints emanating from a denial of a security 
clearance (s. 42), as well as matters that are referred to it by the Canadian Human Rights 
Commission under s. 45 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, when the 
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(a)  SIRC Immigration Role 
Prior to 2002, SIRC also had an important role in immigration 
proceedings in which the government was seeking to remove a 
permanent resident (as opposed to a simple foreign national) on, among 
other things, national security-related grounds.28  
Under the Immigration Act, as it then was, where the Minister of 
Immigration and the then-Solicitor General of Canada were of the 
opinion, based on security or criminal intelligence reports received and 
considered by them, that a permanent resident was a person inadmissible 
to Canada on, inter alia, security grounds, a report would be issued to 
SIRC. Once received by SIRC, the chair of the latter would assign one or 
more members to investigate the report’s accuracy. Following its 
deliberations on this question, SIRC would make a report to the 
Governor-in-Council containing “its conclusion whether or not a 
certificate should be issued” by the latter, along with reasons. 
Subsequently, if it was persuaded that the named person was 
inadmissible on, inter alia, security grounds, the Governor-in-Council 
could then instruct the immigration minister to issue a certificate to that 
effect.29 This certificate, in turn, resulted in the issuance of a deportation 
order, subject to a truncated right of appeal of that deportation order to 
the Immigration Appeal Division.30 Both the SIRC recommendation and 
the decision of the Governor-in-Counsel were reviewable on standard 
judicial review grounds in Federal Court.31 
In the course of performing its assessment, SIRC members were 
provided with the information the government had relied upon in making 
its findings. In fact, under the CSIS Act, SIRC is entitled “to have access 
to any information under the control of”, inter alia CSIS, “that relates to 
the performance of the duties and functions of the Committee and to 
receive from [CSIS] such information, reports and explanations as the 
Committee deems necessary for the performance of its duties and 
                                                                                                             
complaint raises security considerations. As well, SIRC can investigate complaints regarding the 
Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29. 
28
  Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, s. 39 [hereinafter “Immigration Act”], now repealed 
by IRPA. 
29
  Id., s. 40. 
30
  Id., ss. 27, 32 and s. 70(4), now repealed by the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 
S.C. 2001, c. 27. 
31
  See, e.g., Al Yamani v. Canada (Solicitor General), [1995] F.C.J. No. 1453, [1996] 1 
F.C. 174 (F.C.T.D.); Moumdjian v. Canada (Security Intelligence Review Committee), [1999] F.C.J. 
No. 1160, [1999] 4 F.C. 624 (F.C.A.). 
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functions”.32 Cabinet confidences are exempted from this rule, an 
exception of limited significance in most of SIRC’s work.33 
Further, under the CSIS Act, as incorporated into the then-existing 
immigration law, SIRC had (and in relation to its still existing 
complaints and investigations role, retains) broad powers to subpoena 
persons and documents.34  
(b)  Procedure 
(i)  Disclosure 
Under its rules of procedure for complaints, SIRC members decide 
how much of the government information is disclosed to the named 
person, after consultation with the director of CSIS. The SIRC rules 
employed in immigration cases provided that, subject to the SIRC 
member’s oath of secrecy,35 “it [was] within the discretion of the 
assigned members in balancing the requirements of preventing threats to 
the security of Canada and providing fairness to the person affected to 
determine if the facts of the case justif[ied] that the substance of the 
representations made by one party should be disclosed to one or more of 
the other parties”.36  
Prior to disclosure, SIRC would (and in relation to SIRC’s 
continuing complaints role, does) consult with the director of CSIS, to 
determine the extent of disclosure permissible under SIRC’s oath of 
secrecy. SIRC engages in negotiations with CSIS to arrive at a 
consensus as to what information can be released to the named person. 
                                                                                                             
32
  CSIS Act, supra, note 26, s. 39. 
33
  Murray Rankin, “The Security Intelligence Review Committee: Reconciling National 
Security with Procedural Fairness” (1990) 3 Can. J. Admin. L. & Prac. 173, at 182 (“It must be 
stressed that the Committee has access to virtually all information, even source reports collected by 
the Service, and can use this information in reaching its decision. The only exception to this rule of 
access pertains to Cabinet records in the possession of the Service, but in almost all complaints 
cases, this statutory exception would be of limited relevance”). 
34
  CSIS Act, supra, note 26, s. 50, referenced in Immigration Act, supra, note 28, s. 40(5), 
now repealed by IRPA. 
35
  Members of SIRC and its employees must comply with all security requirements under 
the CSIS Act and take an oath of secrecy. Supra, note 26, s. 37. They are also “persons permanently 
bound to secrecy” under the Security of Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. O-5, and are therefore 
subject to that statute’s penalties for wrongful disclosure of sensitive information. 
36
  SIRC, Rules of Procedure of the Security Intelligence Review Committee in Relation to 
its Function under Paragraph 38(c) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, para. 
46(2)(a). See also para. 48(4) (providing for a similar balancing where a party is excluded from vice 
voce testimony). 
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Where SIRC and the director disagreed firmly, in theory the question of 
disclosure could be adjudicated by the Federal Court under section 38 of 
the Canada Evidence Act,37 described below.38 
In performing its functions, SIRC was and is empowered to hold ex 
parte and in camera hearings to receive information that is not disclosed 
on security grounds. In the ex parte hearings, several counsel are 
present: counsel to CSIS, counsel for any witnesses, counsel for any 
government departments with an interest in the case, and SIRC’s own 
counsel.39 The latter include inside counsel and/or a SIRC legal agent.  
(ii)  SIRC Inside Counsel and SIRC Legal Agents 
Inside counsel are employees of SIRC and part of its bureaucratic 
staff and have a close, but still-arm’s length, working relationship with 
CSIS. (Staff from both organizations have regular contact with each 
other). At the time of this research, SIRC had two in-house counsel.40 
SIRC counsel are charged with probing the government position, 
and in so doing further the complainant’s interests. In immigration 
matters, they were (and in relation to SIRC’s continuing complaints 
function, are) charged with challenging decisions on the non-disclosure 
of the information contained in the closed material, as well as cross-
examining government witnesses in ex parte proceedings. Describing 
this counsel’s role, a former SIRC legal advisor wrote in 1990: 
The Committee’s counsel is instructed to cross-examine witnesses for 
the Service with as much vigour as one would expect from the 
complainant’s counsel. Having been present during the unfolding of 
the complainant’s case, the Committee counsel is able to pursue the 
same line of questions. In addition, however, since Committee counsel 
has the requisite security clearance and has had the opportunity to 
review files not available to the complainant’s counsel, he or she is 
                                                                                                             
37
  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5. 
38
  This eventuality has not yet arisen. However, on occasion SIRC has received letters from 
Department of Justice counsel acting on behalf of CSIS warning SIRC that if the disclosure of 
information was not made in accordance with the direction of CSIS, that the Department of Justice 
counsel would initiate proceedings under the Canada Evidence Act to prohibit the disclosure. 
Seeking Justice, supra, note 10, at 7. 
39
  It should be noted that a lawyer holding a Top Secret clearance who represents a 
department in the case (for instance) of a security clearance denial, and any departmental 
representative is usually excluded from the hearing while a CSIS witness testifies before the Review 
Committee ex parte in camera. Hence, there are occasions when not only the complainant and the 
complainant’s counsel are excluded from the hearing. Seeking Justice, id. 
40
  Id. 
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also able to explore issues and particulars that would be unknown to 
the complainant’s counsel.41 
Still, as this same author also noted, “a great deal turns on the ability 
of Committee counsel to perform effectively in this unfamiliar role”.42 
Outside counsel (or “legal agents”) may be retained in some cases 
where, because of workload issues, inside counsel is not fully capable of 
acting in the adversarial proceedings. In other cases, legal agents may be 
retained where inside counsel judge that the case will require particularly 
aggressive cross-examination of CSIS. Certainly, inside counsel will 
conduct forceful cross-examination in the cases with which they are 
charged. However, SIRC inside counsel must strive to remain (and 
appear to remain) objective and impartial in order to protect SIRC from 
any real or perceived apprehension of bias. In those cases where a 
particularly aggressive cross-examination is required, SIRC may retain a 
legal agent to preclude an apprehension of bias directed towards SIRC or 
SIRC’s counsel. In other cases, where an issue of law is particularly 
sensitive or complex, SIRC may retain legal agents to provide an expert 
opinion.43  
In practice, the extent to which legal agents are employed has 
reportedly varied over the years, reflecting the predispositions of 
changing SIRC administrators and the case load at SIRC. As of the time 
of this writing, there were four legal agents on the SIRC list, of varying 
levels of experience. These individuals were selected on a fairly informal 
basis, without a formal application process, and are security-cleared. At 
present, whenever a legal agent is retained by SIRC for a case, that 
retainer must be authorized by the Department of Justice.44 Justice 
generally accommodates SIRC requests for outside counsel and 
understands the need for SIRC to maintain an arm’s length relationship 
with government.45  
                                                                                                             
41
  Rankin, supra, note 33, at 184. 
42
  Id. 
43
  Seeking Justice, supra, note 10, at 8. 
44
  This authorization is required in accordance with s. 4 of the Government Contracts 
Regulations, SOR/87-402 and the Treasury Board Common Services Policy. For a discussion of the 
government’s legal agents rules, see online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/dept-min/la-man/index.html>. 
Note that rates of pay for legal agents on the government scale are lower than what these individuals 
likely bill private clients.  
45
  SIRC sought a delegation of authority to contract for legal agents from the Department 
of Justice on September 21, 2006 to ensure its independence and impartiality. By letter dated 
October 21, 2006, the Assistant Deputy Attorney General for the Civil Litigation Branch of the 
Department of Justice informed SIRC that a delegation of authority would not be granted and all 
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The pool of lawyers across Canada from which SIRC can select 
legal agents is small. SIRC can only retain outside counsel who are in 
possession of a top secret clearance, are not in a conflict of interest with 
either the government or the named person and have expertise in 
litigation and national security matters. There may also be a language 
requirement for the contract depending on the first language of the 
named person or the CSIS witnesses.46  
(iii) Relationship with Named Person 
SIRC in-house and outside counsel are able to maintain contact with 
the named person and his or her counsel throughout the process. SIRC 
lawyers or legal agents may, therefore, question the named person even 
after the former are fully apprised of the secret information against the 
latter. In so doing, they take special care not to disclose (even 
involuntarily) secret information.47  
Even with this restriction, one of SIRC’s outside counsel is on 
record as indicating that this questioning, despite being done in an 
oblique manner to avoid involuntary disclosures of secret information, is 
central in unearthing potentially exculpatory information and observed 
that some cases at least have turned on information obtained from the 
named person in this manner.48  
After reviewing the CSIS file, SIRC inside or outside counsel will 
have contact with the named person and their counsel to converse and to 
obtain a list of questions that these persons may wish to have asked 
during the secret proceeding. Likewise SIRC inside or outside counsel 
may have contact with the named person after a summary of information 
tabled in the secret proceedings has been provided to the latter. After 
reviewing the summary, the named person may wish to have additional 
CSIS witnesses appear before the Committee and hence be cross-
examined by SIRC counsel.49 
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  Seeking Justice, id. 
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  Id. See also on this point, testimony of Mr. Gordon Cameron (SIRC outside counsel and 
now special advocate), Proceedings of the Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism, Issue 4 — 
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No SIRC in-house or outside counsel has ever reportedly received 
any complaints from the government that this contact with the named 
person has resulted in an involuntary disclosure injurious to national 
security.50 
2.  The United Kingdom System of Special Advocates 
(a)  Overview 
Before 1997, a decision to deport an individual from the United 
Kingdom on national security grounds was strictly an executive 
decision, made personally by the Home Secretary. The latter based his or 
her determination on all relevant material, including information that 
was withheld from the named person on national security grounds. 
Where the government asserted national security confidentiality, the 
deportation decision was referred to a panel (dubbed the “Three Wise 
Men”) who reviewed the Home Secretary’s determination and made 
recommendations on whether the removal order should stand.51 
This system was challenged successfully by a named person in the 
European Court of Human Rights. In Chahal v. U.K.,52 the Court 
concluded that the U.K. system violated the European Convention on 
Human Rights because it precluded court review and denied any means 
for lawyers representing the named persons’ interests to challenge secret 
information against the latter. In the course of deciding the case, the 
Court alluded to the system employed by the Federal Court of Canada 
involving what are now known as special advocates. Since no such 
system then-existed before the Federal Court, the European Court was 
probably referring to the SIRC system discussed above. 
In direct response to Chahal, the U.K. parliament enacted the 
Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997.53 This statute 
created the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (“SIAC”), a 
superior court of record sitting in panels comprising a High Court judge 
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  Treasury Solicitors Department, “Special Advocates: A Guide to the Role of Special 
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(or other holder of high judicial office), an immigration adjudicator and 
a lay member with security and intelligence expertise. SIAC hears 
asylum and immigration appeals (and now citizenship revocation cases) 
involving national security.54  
(b)  Special Advocates 
The SIAC Act authorizes the appointment of a special advocate — 
that is, “a person to represent the interests of an appellant in any 
proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission from 
which the appellant and any legal representative of his are excluded”.55 
Once an appeal is lodged with SIAC against a government immigration 
decision, the U.K. Secretary of State decides whether the appeal is likely 
to implicate information that will not be disclosed to the named person 
on national security grounds. In these circumstances, a special advocate 
may be (and in practice invariably is) appointed by the U.K. Attorney 
General. In fact, the government may not rely on “closed” — that is 
secret — information at the hearings if no special advocate is 
appointed.56 
While special advocates were once appointed to a specific case by 
the Attorney-General, named persons now select a special advocate from 
the roster. In practice, the Special Advocates Support Office (“SASO”), 
a division of the Treasury Solicitor’s Department working at arm’s 
length from the rest of the department, informs the named person’s 
solicitors of the appointment and provides the list of barristers on the 
special advocate roster. The named person is asked to name his or her 
preference of lead and junior special advocates, subject to availability 
and the absence of any conflict of interest.57 
(i)  Key Functions 
(A) CHALLENGING THE GOVERNMENT CASE 
As noted, the SA acts in the best interest of the named person. SAs 
are specifically charged in SIAC and control order proceedings with “(a) 
making submissions to the court at any hearings from which the relevant 
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party and his legal representatives are excluded; (b) cross-examining 
witnesses at any such hearings; and (c) making written submissions to 
the court”.58 
In practice, SAs may present arguments on the admissibility of 
government information, albeit under rules that are quite permissive on 
the question of admissibility.59 SAs presumably present arguments on the 
weight information should be given by the tribunal. SAs do also cross-
examine government witnesses, exploring inferences drawn from 
government information or inconsistencies in witnesses’ testimony.60  
Lord Carlile, the independent examiner of U.K. anti-terrorism laws, 
has reported that SA “analysis and examination of factual matters” has 
been rigorous.61 Further, there have in fact been instances where SAs 
have challenged successfully at least part of the government’s case by 
noting discrepancies in the government’s approach between cases. In 
one circumstance, the government used information in one case that had 
been discredited in the other. The government was challenged 
successfully on this practice by the SA, who happened to be the same 
person in both cases. All told, by summer 2007, there had reportedly 
been three successful SIAC appeals (and several bail hearings) in which 
the SA had played a significant role.62 In a number of other cases, the SA 
has pressed the government on matters of consistency and disclosure 
with significant impact, but without altering the overall outcome of the 
case.63  
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  SIAC Rules, S.I. 2003/1034, r. 35. 
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(B)  PRESSING FOR FULLER DISCLOSURE TO THE SPECIAL ADVOCATE 
HIMSELF OR HERSELF 
The SIAC rules require the government to serve on the SA a copy of 
the closed material.64 The nature of the closed information provided to 
SAs varies. Sometimes, for instance, SAs do receive actual transcriptions 
of intercepted communications. In other instances, SAs receive 
analytical summaries or assessments prepared by the security services 
that may quote from intercept materials. In the latter instance, SAs worry 
that the assessment is selective, reflecting the government’s position and 
not necessarily a full or fully contextualized rendition of recorded 
conversations. Moreover, these summaries sometimes contain “piled” 
hearsay — that is, second-hand (or perhaps seventh or eighth hand) 
accounts of inculpatory conversations. Some of these accounts may be 
supplied by other security services, in summary analytical form. In this 
manner, subjective analysis is compounded by subjective analysis.65 
In his 2004 review of the relevant provisions in U.K. anti-terrorism 
law, Lord Carlile concluded “that there has been meticulous attention to 
the importance of disclosure in an appropriate way of material adverse to 
the Secretary of State’s case or otherwise of assistance to the 
Appellant”.66 There is no consensus on this point, however. Several SAs 
suggest that while they interpret the rules as obliging disclosure of both 
inculpatory and exculpatory information, the government sometimes 
fails to disclose exculpatory information in its possession. SAs have had 
to rely on the government’s own assessment of what information is 
relevant. For this reason, the material SAs themselves receive is 
sometimes redacted — that is, portions are blacked out supposedly 
because they are irrelevant.67 
The government’s assessment of what is relevant reportedly does not 
always dovetail with SA views. SAs are reportedly aware of cases in 
which important exculpatory information was not disclosed, but only 
learned of this fact because the same SA appeared on two different 
cases. In one of these cases, information pertinent to (and exculpatory in) 
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  SIAC Rules, S.I. 2003/1034, r. 37. 
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another case was disclosed that had not been provided in the original 
matter.68  
SAs have, therefore, sometimes pressed the government to disclose 
to the SAs themselves more than is on the closed record. While their 
legal right to do so is unclear, SAs obviously see their role as being not 
simply reactive; that is, to respond to and probe the information already 
provided by government. Instead, they have taken a proactive approach, 
asking for more information.69 The SA capacity to press for full 
disclosure will likely be enhanced by recent procedural rule changes. 
Under these amendments, the government is expressly obligated to 
disclose both a statement of the information on which it relies and “any 
exculpatory material” of which it is aware.70 The new rules also set out 
clear standards of how the government is to conduct its search for 
exculpatory materials.71 
By the time of this research, it remained to be seen how diligently 
the government would perform these responsibilities. SAs complained 
that government disclosure of information to the SAs under the original 
rules had often been very tardy, to the extent that SAs have often not 
been able to execute effectively their function in pressing for greater 
disclosure to the named persons themselves, described below.72  
SA concerns about government disclosure extend beyond documents. 
One SA reported that over time, the government and SIAC judges have 
been more restrictive in terms of the sorts of persons they will allow to 
be cross-examined by SAs. Whereas previously, SAs could cross-
examine “agency-handlers”, the security services no longer permit 
questioning of persons with close knowledge of sources, and SIAC has 
backed the government position.73  
(C)  ENHANCING DISCLOSURE TO THE NAMED PERSONS AND THEIR 
COUNSEL 
SAs clearly see as one of their key (and perhaps principal) roles 
pressing for greater disclosure to the named persons and their counsel. In 
performing his or her functions, the SA serves the best interest of the 
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named person by acting as an impartial assessor of secret information 
and championing its release where the SA believes it warranted. Thus, 
having vetted the closed information, SAs may urge the release of 
innocuous information, and may obtain the consent of the government to 
this disclosure. Sometimes this release may come in the form of a 
sanitized summary of closed information. In other instances, it may 
constitute the actual information in question. For example, the SA may 
find an alternative, open source for some of the closed information, 
thereby discrediting the view that this information is non-disclosable to 
the named person. One SA indicated, for example, that in some cases 
SAs have been able to force the government to provide fuller disclosure 
by doing Internet searches to establish that information that was being 
withheld was readily available over the Internet.74 Cross-referencing 
closed material against public source information available elsewhere is 
obviously a time-consuming activity, one that SAs have in the past said 
is difficult for them to undertake.75  
(D) COMMUNICATING EXISTENCE OF GROUNDS FOR APPEALS 
SAs do not themselves have standing to appeal SIAC decisions to 
the Court of Appeal, a handicap that some SAs believe should be 
corrected. However, the SA may seek permission from the tribunal to 
contact the named person and communicate the existence of grounds for 
appeal. The actual grounds may concern closed information, and may 
not, therefore, be disclosable. However, the SA would then be able to 
plead closed grounds before the Court of Appeal.76 
(c)  Shortcomings of the Special Advocate System 
The single most controversial aspect of the U.K. system is the 
inability of SAs to communicate with the named person once they are in 
“closed”. That is, once an SA has been given access to the closed 
material in the case, she or he may have no communication with the 
named persons or their solicitor without the permission of the tribunal. 
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This permission, in turn, can only be provided after the government has 
a chance to respond to the request.77  
As several SAs argued before a parliamentary committee in 2005, 
the fact that questions to named persons during the closed session are 
vetted by the government — the opponent in the proceedings — 
“precludes communications even on matters of pure legal strategy”.78 
The questions asked — passed through the tribunal and security services 
— could well spark the interest of the security services, in a manner 
prejudicial to the named person. A subsequent failure of the SA in the 
proceeding to then rely on whatever answer was provided by the named 
person would also attract the attention of the security services.79 
Without question, these strict limitations on communications between 
named persons and special advocates constitute the most dramatic 
departure from conventional fair trial standards and the most controversial 
aspect of the U.K. special advocate system. They also differ from the 
SIRC approach described above, which permits continued communication. 
The U.K. communication rules reflect the government’s preoccupation 
with inadvertent disclosure; that is, information conveyed to the named 
person through the questions asked. This concern with inadvertent 
disclosure does not, however, extend to government counsel or the 
security services. The latter are not restricted in their communications 
once they have accessed secret material and do question the named 
person before or during the proceedings. This inconsistent approach on 
inadvertent disclosure may reflect an expectation (unwarranted, in the 
eyes of SAs) that those prosecuting the case are less likely to ask the 
sorts of questions that unintentionally convey secret information.80 
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In our research, SAs consistently acknowledged that their inability to 
communicate (other than in the narrowest circumstances) with the 
named persons or their solicitors after receiving closed material impairs 
their effectiveness.81 SAs are obviously ill positioned to challenge the 
credibility of government information in the same way they might do so 
in a regular proceeding; that is, by offering an exculpatory explanation 
(of the sort that can only be derived from the named person him or 
herself) for superficially incriminating information. For example, a 
named person impugned by a secret government informer might be able 
to cast doubt on the information provided by the informer in a way that 
no SA could (e.g., the informer and the named person have a history of 
animosity that might drive the former to lie about the latter).  
SAs are technically permitted to call witnesses on behalf of the 
named person, but one SA has written that “this is a practical 
impossibility because even if one knew what witnesses were available, 
calling them to address issues of fact would alert them to the nature of 
the issues that have to be kept closed in the first place. Expert witnesses 
will be unable to comment on a secret assessment without themselves 
being security-cleared and having authorized access to the resources of 
the security service on which the assessment is based.”82 Moreover, if 
SAs put forward a positive case in the closed sessions, “that positive 
case is inevitably based on conjecture. They have no way of knowing 
whether it is the case that the appellant himself would wish to 
advance.”83 
All told, SAs indicated that they were usually ill equipped to 
undermine the government’s theory of the case — as noted, only a few 
cases have collapsed when probed by the SA. Some SAs indicated that 
in circumstances where the government’s case cannot be challenged 
effectively on the basis of the information available to the SA, they 
sometimes are obliged to take a more passive role in the hearings, 
declining for example to pursue lines of cross-examination that may lead 
in unexpected (and, for the named person, potentially) prejudicial 
directions.84 
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The defence lawyers to whom we spoke emphasized quite pointedly 
that the SAs’ ability to offer a full answer and defence is non-existent, 
given the constraints on communication between the SA and the named 
person. They cautioned against overstating the utility of SAs in 
challenging the government case. Critics of the SA system urge that a 
system in which named persons do not know the case against them 
cannot be fair. It contaminates the system of justice and breeds cynicism 
on the part of named persons.85 SAs “give a veneer of legality” to this 
fundamentally unfair system.86 One former SA who resigned in protest 
writes that his “role was to provide a fig leaf of respectability and a false 
legitimacy to indefinite detention without knowledge of the accusations 
being made and without any kind of criminal charge or trial”.87  
These complaints have been echoed by parliamentary committees. In 
July 2007, the U.K. Parliament Joint Committee on Human Rights 
issued a strongly worded report describing the special advocate system 
as “‘Kafkaesque’ or like the Star Chamber”.88 On the specific issue of 
special advocates and communication with named persons, it made the 
following recommendation: 
In our view it is essential, if Special Advocates are to be able to 
perform their function, that there is greater opportunity than currently 
exists for communication between the Special Advocate and the 
controlled person. … With appropriate guidance and safeguards, we 
think it is possible to relax the current prohibition whilst ensuring that 
sensitive national security information is not disclosed. We therefore 
recommend a relaxation of the current prohibition on any 
communication between the special advocate and the person concerned 
or their legal representative after the special advocate has seen the 
closed material.89 
The Committee also criticized the level of disclosure made by the 
government to the named person — concluding that secrecy is 
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sometimes excessive — and the low burden of proof the government 
must satisfy to make-out its SIAC case. 
IV. BILL C-3 AND SPECIAL ADVOCATES 
This article now turns to reviewing Bill C-3 and the aftermath of the 
Charkaoui decision. 
1. Post-Charkaoui Policy Focus 
The Supreme Court released the Charkaoui decision on February 23, 
2007. Critically, it suspended its declaration of constitutional invalidity 
for one year, until February 23, 2008. Upon the expiry of this deadline, 
those named persons subject to a certificate deemed reasonable under the 
prior system could “apply to have the certificates quashed”.90 Put another 
way, individuals who the government claimed were grave threats to 
national security would no longer be subject to the security certificate 
process, unless Parliament enacted a replacement system curing the 
constitutional deficiencies of the IRPA by late February 2008. 
Not surprisingly, in the immediate aftermath of the Charkaoui 
decision, the policy focus was on special counsel. For instance, a month 
after Charkaoui, a special senate committee recommended that a special 
counsel process be extended to all proceedings where “information is 
withheld from a party in the interest of national security and he or she is 
therefore not in a position to make full answer and defence”, including 
under the IRPA, the Criminal Code terrorist group listing process, the 
Charities Registration (Security Information) Act91 and the Canada 
Evidence Act.92 Moreover, the committee urged that the special counsel 
be empowered to communicate with the affected parties after receiving 
confidential information, subject to guidelines designed to bar the 
release of secret information. The counterpart Commons committee also 
recommended a comprehensive “panel of special counsel” for national 
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security cases,93 but without weighing in on the precise design of this 
system. 
The government, for its part, remained silent on its response to 
Charkaoui through the winter, spring, summer and early Fall of 2007. Its 
only pronouncement on the issue came on July 18, 2007, when the 
government responded to the above-noted Commons committee 
recommendations. The government affirmed the need to address the 
Supreme Court’s February ruling within one year, and simply indicated 
that it was studying “the possibility of establishing a special advocate 
role in the security certificate process”. 94 
Despite the notoriety of the security certificate system and the 
controversy and public attention sparked by it, no public consultations 
were held and no formal notice was given of the government’s approach 
to the special counsel issue until Bill C-3 was tabled in the House of 
Commons and received first reading on October 22, 2007, fully eight 
months after the Charkaoui decision and four months prior to the expiry 
of the one-year suspension of the declaration of invalidity.  
2. The Bill C-3 Model 
As noted above, the Supreme Court of Canada canvassed a number 
of special counsel options in Charkaoui without mandating a particular 
model. The government was, therefore, presented with a choice in the 
crafting of Bill C-3, including the choice of building on Canada’s 
indigenous experience with SIRC in immigration and other matters. In 
comparison, a U.K.-style model — with its strict restrictions on 
continued contact between special advocate and named person once the 
former had reviewed the secret information and concerns about full 
disclosure — would constitute a departure from the SIRC approach. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court itself was alive to criticisms of the U.K. 
system, including those concerning restrictions on contact between 
named person and special advocate.95 
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Nevertheless, for reasons that have never been satisfactorily 
explained to these authors, Bill C-3 drew its clear inspiration from the 
United Kingdom.96 As Roach observes, in so doing the government 
selected, and Parliament ratified, “the only alternative that the [Supreme] 
Court recognized [in Charkaoui] had been subject to criticism and the 
one alternative that arguably achieves the worst job of all the alternatives 
in ensuring fair treatment of the affected person”.97 
(a)  Features of Bill C-3 Special Advocate Model 
Pursuant to Bill C-3, the Minister of Justice is instructed to 
“establish a list of persons who may act as special advocates”.98 
Although not in a solicitor-client relationship with the named person,99 
the “special advocate’s role is to protect the interests of the permanent 
resident or foreign national in a [security certificate] proceeding … when 
information or other evidence is heard in the absence of the public and of 
the permanent resident or foreign national and their counsel”.100 To this 
end, the special advocate “may challenge (a) the Minister’s claim that 
the disclosure of information or other evidence would be injurious to 
national security or endanger the safety of any person; and (b) the 
relevance, reliability and sufficiency of information or other evidence 
that is provided by the Minister and is not disclosed to the permanent 
resident or foreign national and their counsel, and the weight to be given 
to it”.101 
In terms of his or her specific methods, the special advocate may: 
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in the truth. The government’s explanation for its reliance on the U.K. model does not, however, 
answer the question of why they did not graft onto that model the more rights-protecting aspects of 
the SIRC approach, not least in terms of continued access to the named person and robust full 
disclosure powers. 
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(a) make oral and written submissions with respect to the information 
and other evidence that is provided by the Minister and is not disclosed 
to the permanent resident or foreign national and their counsel; 
(b) participate in, and cross-examine witnesses who testify during, any 
part of the proceeding that is held in the absence of the public and of 
the permanent resident or foreign national and their counsel; and 
(c) exercise, with the judge’s authorization, any other powers that are 
necessary to protect the interests of the permanent resident or foreign 
national.102 
There are, however, serious restrictions on the special advocate’s ability 
to communicate. The government is obliged to, inter alia, “file with the 
Court the information and other evidence on which the certificate is 
based” once the matter is referred to the Federal Court.103 The special 
advocate is entitled to receive this information.104 However, upon receipt 
of the secret information to which the named person is denied access, 
“the special advocate may, during the remainder of the proceeding, 
communicate with another person about the proceeding only with the 
judge’s authorization and subject to any conditions that the judge 
considers appropriate”.105 
(b)  Shortcomings of the Bill C-3 Model 
Following the tabling of Bill C-3, the bill was welcomed by some106 
and critiqued by others.107 For their part, these authors joined others in 
critiquing the special advocate model on several grounds.108  
                                                                                                             
102
  Id., s. 85.2. 
103
  Id., s. 77(2). 
104
  Id., s. 85.4(1). 
105
  Id., s. 85.4(2). 
106
  See, e.g., “Detaining suspects in security’s name” The Globe and Mail, October 24, 
2007. 
107
  See, e.g., Janet Cleveland, Sharryn J. Aiken & Francois Crepeau, “The rights of non-
citizens; The recent addition of special advocates to the security certificate process does little to 
protect the accused” Ottawa Citizen, October 31, 2007. 
108
  See, e.g., Craig Forcese, “Is Bill C-3 the Security Way to Go?” The Globe and Mail, 
February 6, 2008 and Craig Forcese & Lorne Waldman, “Canada doesn’t need a star chamber” The 
National Post, October 25, 2007. 
380 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
(i)  Full Disclosure 
First, the law specifically authorizes the special advocate to review 
secret information provided by the government to the judge in the 
security certificate process. However, it includes no express procedures 
for the special advocate to reach beyond this information and seek and 
obtain government records not already disclosed to the court (other than 
simply to ask the judge to oblige this disclosure). A special advocate will 
be hard pressed to persuade a judge to allow this access: He or she will 
be reduced to arguing that he or she suspects that there might be further 
relevant material, but not having access to it, will have difficulty making 
this case. 
Certainly, the Federal Court currently demands that all relevant 
information be disclosed to the court itself.109 Yet, what the government 
considers “relevant” and what a special advocate charged with defending 
the best interests of the detained person considers “relevant” will not 
always correspond. That is a lesson we extracted from the United 
Kingdom experience described above. It is also consistent with the 
phenomena of tunnel vision described by Kent Roach; that is  
… a process in which authorities, often with the noblest of intentions, 
fixate on a person’s purported guilt, discount or ignore information that 
points to the person’s innocence and interpret ambiguous and even 
innocent information as evidence of a person’s guilt. Tunnel vision is 
not necessarily the product of deliberate misconduct by officials, but 
can be the product of institutional pressures that increase as the state 
has invested much time and resources in focusing on a suspect.110 
The risk of tunnel vision is arguably more acute in relation to processes 
reliant on security intelligence rather than evidence. First, evidence 
marshalled in the criminal context is variable, but generally falls within 
an expected range of forensic and witness information, notes taken 
contemporaneously by police officers and the like. Police agencies have 
                                                                                                             
109
  See, e.g., Re Charkaoui, [2006] F.C.J. No. 868, 2006 FCA 206, at para. 24 (F.C.A.), on 
appeal to the Supreme Court at the time of this writing. In that same case, however, the court also 
focused on the fact that security certificates are administrative and not criminal proceedings, and 
tailored its position on disclosure accordingly, denying that R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, 
[1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.), rules apply in the security certificate context. It should be noted that 
the outcome of security certificate processes may be more serious than anything the Criminal Code, 
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 could impose — indefinite detention without charge and removal to torture. In 
these circumstances, the nominal invocation of criminal versus administrative to define the scope of 
disclosure rules is utterly unpersuasive and inconsistent with the notion that “fundamental justice” in 
s. 7 varies with the circumstances, not least the gravity of consequences to the interested party. 
110
  Roach, supra, note 4. 
(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) A BISMARCKIAN MOMENT 381 
established rules and procedures on chain of custody and the entire 
process is hemmed by rigorous rules of evidence governing admissibility 
(not least, rules barring hearsay, for the most part).  
In comparison, as discussed further below, security certificate 
proceedings are constrained by virtually none of these rules and the 
information on which they turn may include direct evidence of 
culpability (such as transcripts of intercepts) but (as we understand it) is 
often more circumstantial, involving risk assessments and analysts 
reports far removed from direct evidence of conduct. The product 
ultimately tabled in court may be a Canadian analyst report, drawing on 
the analyst report of allied agencies. Analysts report piled on analyst 
report compounds subjectivity with subjectivity, and information is 
shifted and discarded by many hands before being presented in its 
refined form in court. In these circumstances, the prospect that relevant 
(and indeed exculpatory) information might go missing seems enormous. 
Second, it cannot be forgotten that security certificate processes are 
ex parte. Unlike in conventional criminal trials, the interested party is 
not present, and therefore is in no position to query unfamiliar 
government interpretations of events that the person may have been part 
of. Nor can they identify gaps in the record they know must exist 
because of their familiarity with these events. The special advocate is left 
to operate without these insights. 
Under these circumstances, disclosure rules cannot rely simply on 
the good faith of government without risking serious miscarriages of 
justice. We took the view that Bill C-3 should integrate an independent 
third party into the process, able to examine the full government files 
and certify full disclosure. Given its long-standing familiarity with 
security intelligence and its expertise in reviewing files of this nature, we 
urged that SIRC be authorized to conduct such a process, when asked to 
do so by a special advocate. 
(ii)  Continued Contact between Special Advocate and Named Person 
Second, the law does not close the door on continued contact 
between the special advocate and the interested party subject to the 
certificate. Nor, however, does it affirmatively guard this right. Instead, 
this is a matter left to the discretion of the judge. Given the 
uncontroversial practice of allowing continued access in the SIRC 
context, and the vital nature of that continued contact to the effectiveness 
of the SIRC counsel in at least some cases, we urged that language of the 
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bill be reversed, creating a presumption of continued access, subject only 
to reasonable limitations necessary to protect the integrity of the secret 
information. 
(iii) Range of Complaints Concerning Bill C-3 
The statistical frequency and nature of these and other issues 
commentators raised with parliamentarians during deliberations over the 
bill is estimated in Table 1: 
Table 1: Range and Statistical Frequency of Issues Raised by  
Non-governmental Witnesses in Parliamentary Proceedings111 
Issue Commons  
(% out of 20) 
Senate  
(% out of 22) 
Security certificate regime restricts communication 
between advocate and named person once former has 
seen secret evidence 
55% 59% 
Security certificate regime still does not allow full 
answer and defence by named person 
45% 59% 
No explicit (or an insufficient) rejection of evidence 
derived from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment and/or other concerns about the reliability of 
information used in security certificate proceedings 
40% 50% 
“Reasonableness” standard of proof required of 
government too low 
40% 36% 
Nature of the relationship between special advocate 
and named person is unclear and/or no (or insufficient) 
guarantee of confidentiality in relation to information 
provided by named person to special advocate 
40% 9% 
Creation of special advocate roster not independent 
from government and selection process opaque/lack of 
choice of special advocate by individual 
35% 13% 
Potential that not all relevant information will be 
disclosed to the judge and special advocate 
35% 45% 
Security certificate regime creates a system of unequal 
treatment between citizens and non-citizens 
30% 32% 
No (or insufficient) assurances of resources, staff for 
special advocates 
30% 5% 
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Issue Commons  
(% out of 20) 
Senate  
(% out of 22) 
Potential for process to lead to indefinite detention 30% 23% 
Law has not addressed removal to torture 25% 23% 
Limited appeal rights 20% 18% 
Security certificate regime unduly augments the power 
of the security services 
5% — 
Power of special advocate to call witnesses and 
present documentary evidence unclear 
5% 9% 
No periodic review of the workings of the law — 5% 
Legislation includes no anti-discrimination clause — 9% 
Legislation fails to define sufficiently concepts such as 
national security 
— 5% 
3.  Parliamentary Proceedings 
As noted, Bill C-3 was tabled in Parliament in October 2007, only 
months before the February 2008 deadline imposed by the Supreme 
Court for the expiry of the old system. Notably, the period between 
October 22, 2007 and February 23, 2008 contained only 49 scheduled 
sitting days in the House of Commons (seven weeks) and 54 sitting days 
in the Senate (eight weeks). To the best of our knowledge, at no point 
was serious consideration given by the government or by named persons 
to asking the Supreme Court to extend its deadline, thereby allowing 
careful consideration of Bill C-3. 
The parliamentary proceedings reviewing Bill C-3 were, therefore, 
conducted under pressure.112 These authors spent a number of hours 
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discussing Bill C-3 with parliamentarians in Fall 2007 and early winter 
2008. In these conversations it became clear that at least some 
parliamentarians inclined to tinker substantially with the bill were 
deterred by the prospect that the clock would run out, prompting the 
release of individuals the government characterized as dangerous 
terrorists. There was also serious concern that Bill C-3 would be 
declared a confidence matter by the government, and carried 
amendments might precipitate an election. The Liberal official 
opposition, in particular, did not relish the prospect of fighting an 
election on a terrorism-related theme. There is no doubt in these authors’ 
minds that this political environment affected the willingness of 
parliamentarians to consider seriously amendments to Bill C-3. 
When referred to committee after second reading in the Commons, 
the initial witness list was thin, and largely (although not entirely) 
excluded groups and individuals who opposed security certificates writ 
large in favour of witnesses (like these authors) who proposed 
refinement to the Bill C-3 model. Only after some controversy over this 
roster was the list broadened — at the eleventh hour — to include groups 
such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the “support” 
groups for several of the named persons.113 In sum total, the bill spent 
107 calendar days in the House of Commons. During that time, it was 
debated on seven days in the House of Commons and studied during six 
days in committee. Put another way, the ratio of days on which the bill 
received parliamentary attention to calendar days in the Commons was 
(a modest) 1/8.  
During debate over Bill C-3, commentators occasionally justified 
their positions with doubtful construals of Charkaoui. The government, 
for example, objected (properly) to assertions that the Supreme Court 
had declared security certificates per se unconstitutional.114 On the other 
hand, the government itself occasionally defended parts of its Bill C-3 
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approach with opaque invocations of Charkaoui that arguably overstated 
the holding of that case.115 
Ultimately, the Commons committee focused its amendments on 
four substantive issues: creating a species of confidentiality obligation 
for information obtained by the special advocate during private 
conversations with the interested party; giving some priority to the 
choice of the interested party in identifying who will serve as the special 
advocate; obliging the government to provide appropriate resources to 
the special advocate; and, excluding the prospect of information 
produced by torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment from 
being used as evidence in the proceeding.116  
The last change may prove quite important, as discussed below. 
However, none of these changes addressed the core preoccupations 
about special advocates animating the debate in the United Kingdom; 
specifically, continued access between special advocate and named 
person or full disclosure to the special advocate. Nor did they harmonize 
the special advocate model with that associated with SIRC proceedings.  
The Senate committee proceeding was even more perfunctory. The 
bill only arrived in the Senate on February 6 — quite literally days 
before the expiry of the Supreme Court’s deadline. In sum total, the bill 
was before the Senate for six calendar days. There was little real 
prospect of close Senate scrutiny. Indeed, the government side warned 
against close scrutiny:  
Bill C-3 was introduced in the House on October 22, 2007 and spent 
three and a half months there. It has been thoroughly studied and if we 
in the Senate fail to act in a timely fashion it will have serious 
implications for Canada’s security. If the deadline expires, upon 
application, persons subject to a security certificate could have their 
certificates quashed. This means they could no longer be held in 
detention and could not be subject to any condition of release. This 
could be disastrous given the nature of the threats these persons 
represent.117 
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The real time constraints under which the Senate operated raised the 
ire of senators.118 Their concern is understandable. The Senate Special 
Committee on Anti-terrorism to which the bill was referred has an 
institutional knowledge on security certificates and other anti-terrorism 
issues not shared by its Commons counterpart.119 
Despite a marathon session in which the Senate heard from 24 
witnesses in a single day,120 and despite the committee members’ obvious 
expertise and familiarity with the issue, the Senate made no amendments 
to the bill. Based again on our personal communications with senators, 
the political backdrop was prominent in their thinking. Although dominant 
in the Senate, the Liberal Party was not prepared to pass amendments, 
then requiring reconsideration of the bill by the Commons. This delay 
would take the legislative process past the February 23 deadline and 
allow the government to pin blame for the expiry of the security 
certificate system on the unelected upper chamber.121 By the committee 
member’s own reckoning, their desultory review reflected the imminence 
of the Charkaoui deadline. In its report back to the Senate, the committee 
wrote: 
Recognizing the impending February 23, 2008 deadline imposed by 
the Supreme Court of Canada for Parliament to rectify the 
unconstitutionality of the existing security certificate procedure, the 
Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism is adopting Bill C-3, An 
Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (certificate 
and special advocate) and to make a consequential amendment to 
another Act, without amendment.  
The Committee would have appreciated more time to reflect upon all 
aspects of this bill and the views of those concerned, given the life-
altering effects that security certificates have on those named in them, 
and the reflection the process has on Canadian society and values. 
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Because of the tight timeline for examining Bill C-3, the Committee 
was not able to hear from all parties who requested to appear.122  
When the committee report was debated in the Senate, even 
Conservative senators expressed concern at its content and the process 
that had been followed: “Sometimes we hold our noses when it comes 
time to adopt bills, and we have done so in the past with other 
legislation, knowing that in the near future we will correct the errors we 
have agreed to let through. That is the sort of legislation we have before 
us now.”123 
4.  Implications 
In personal communications with these authors, counsel for those 
subject to security certificates have already indicated that they will 
challenge the special advocate regime on constitutional grounds. 
Inevitably, the Bill C-3 regime will be juxtaposed with the SIRC system, 
raising serious questions as to whether the C-3 regime will be sustained. 
The bill creates an architecture in which Federal Court judges may 
approximate the benefits of the SIRC approach. For example, they may 
authorize SIRC-like continued contact between the special advocate and 
named person and pursue aggressively concerns about the scope of 
disclosure to the Court and special advocate themselves. Absent these 
careful innovations, however, the chances of a successful constitutional 
challenge become more acute.  
It is true that in its section 1 analysis in Charkaoui, the Supreme 
Court indicated that the government need not come up with the perfect 
system.124 It remains to be seen, however, whether the Court will take the 
same approach where those with no constitutional right at stake (for 
example, a government employee complaining to SIRC about security 
clearance denied on a recommendation from CSIS) have a better system 
than those detained and potentially removed to torture under a security 
certificate.  
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V. OTHER FEATURES OF BILL C-3 
Bill C-3’s obvious focus is on the new special advocate system. The 
law also includes, however, a number of other changes and makes 
several omissions with potentially significant implications for the 
security certificate regime. In our view, these features include both 
improvements and missed opportunities. 
1. Improvements in the Exclusion of Coerced Information 
As noted above, one of the amendments made to Bill C-3 during the 
parliamentary process was the inclusion of emphatic language rejecting 
the use of information in security certificate proceedings “that is 
believed on reasonable grounds to have been obtained as a result of the 
use of torture within the meaning of section 269.1 of the Criminal Code, 
or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment within the 
meaning of the Convention Against Torture”.125 
(a) Information and Interrogation Post-9/11 
The change may reflect past controversies over the sorts of 
information allegedly deployed in security certificate proceedings. As 
government officials have repeatedly underscored, Canada depends 
heavily on intelligence supplied by allied agencies.126 However, 
according to testimony in Federal Court, CSIS analysts supplying 
intelligence used to support security certificates have not asked even 
suspect foreign agencies producing this information if it is the product of 
torture.127 
If true, this is a significant omission, given the notorious record on 
torture of many front-line states in the “war on terror” and even close 
Canadian allies. Much of the controversy over post-9/11 interrogation 
tactics has focused on whether the so-called stress or alternative 
interrogation techniques employed by the U.S. military or CIA cross the 
line of CID treatment or even torture. Various U.S. government memos 
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describe interrogation “stress” techniques approved for use in overseas 
military interrogations.128 News stories, meanwhile, have reported on 
CIA interrogation strategies. The latter reportedly include: forceful 
shaking, an open-handed slap “aimed at causing pain and triggering 
fear”, a “hard open-handed slap to the stomach” designed “to cause pain, 
but not internal injury”; forcing detainees “to stand, handcuffed and with 
their feet shackled to an eye bolt in the floor for more than 40 hours”, 
producing “exhaustion and sleep deprivation”; chilling the detainee by 
leaving them to “stand naked in a cell kept near 50 degrees” and dousing 
them with cold water; and, water-boarding, a process by which a 
detainee is “bound to an inclined board, feet raised and head slightly 
below the feet. Cellophane is wrapped over the prisoner’s face and water 
is poured over him”, triggering powerful gag reflexes.129  
Reports on happenings at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq disclose even 
more extreme measures. At Abu Ghraib, concludes a U.S. military 
report, unauthorized, but intentional violent and sexual abuses included 
“acts causing bodily harm using unlawful force as well as sexual 
offenses including, but not limited to rape, sodomy and indecent 
assault”.130 Media reports have pointed to the use of extreme (and 
occasionally deadly) interrogation techniques at places like Bagram, 
Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.131 
Summarizing the U.S. record extracted from 100,000 government 
documents disclosed under U.S. information laws, the American Civil 
Liberties Association reported in 2006 
… a systemic pattern of torture and abuse of detainees in U.S. custody 
in Afghanistan, the U.S. Naval Base Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, 
Iraq, and other locations outside the United States. In many instances 
                                                                                                             
128
  See Karen Greenberg & Joshua Dratel, eds., The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu 
Ghraib (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
129
  Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, “CIA’s Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described” 
ABC News (November 18, 2005). See also Walter Pincus, “Waterboarding Historically 
Controversial” Washington Post, October 5, 2006, at A17. For a discussion of the background to 
CIA interrogations in the “war on terror”, see David Johnston, “At a Secret Interrogation, Dispute 
Flared Over Tactics” New York Times, September 9, 2006. The CIA director denied in 2007 that any 
of the stress techniques employed at “black sites” constituted torture. See Walter Pincus, “CIA 
Chief Complains About Agency’s Critics in Europe” Washington Post, April 17, 2007, at A12. 
130
  Fay-Jones Report (August 2004) in Greenberg & Dratel, Torture Papers, supra, note 
128, at 993. 
131
  See, e.g., Tim Golden, “In U.S. Report, Brutal Details of 2 Afghan Inmates’ Deaths” 
New York Times, May 20, 2005; David Johnston, “More of F.B.I. Memo Criticizing Guantánamo 
Methods Is Released” New York Times, March 22, 2005 at A-17. See also Seymour Hersh, Chain of 
Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib (New York: HarperCollins, 2004). 
390 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
the harsh treatment was ordered as part of an approved list of 
interrogation methods to “soften up” detainees. … Reported methods 
of torture and abuse used against detainees include prolonged 
incommunicado detention; disappearances; beatings; death threats; 
painful stress positions; sexual humiliation; forced nudity; exposure to 
extreme heat and cold; denial of food and water; sensory deprivation 
such as hooding and blindfolding; sleep deprivation; water-boarding; 
use of dogs to inspire fear; and racial and religious insults. In addition, 
around one hundred detainees in U.S. custody in Afghanistan and Iraq 
have died. The government has acknowledged that 27 deaths in U.S. 
custody were homicide, some caused due to “strangulation,” 
“hypothermia,” “asphyxiation,” and “blunt force injuries.”132  
Interrogation techniques employed by other allied states in the 
campaign against terrorism have also generated controversy, especially 
where detainees are placed in the custody of these nations via 
“extraordinary rendition” by the United States or another nation. 
Rendition — covert removals without formal extradition or deportation 
— is not a new practice in the United States. The procedure was 
employed by U.S. officials pre-9/11 to remove expeditiously persons 
wanted abroad for suspected involvement in terrorism.133 It is now 
conducted on a much vaster scale, and its focus has shifted from 
rendition to “justice” to rendition to interrogation (often in circumstances 
where torture is likely).134 Estimates made in 2005 suggested that 150 
people had been rendered by the United States since September 11, 
2001.135 News reports name several states — all of whom have been 
accused by the U.S. State Department of employing torture136 — as the 
countries to which individuals have been rendered. These nations 
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include Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Syria.137 These actions have fuelled 
particular controversy in Europe138 and, after the Arar matter, in Canada. 
U.S. actions have been supported by a well-publicized rethink of 
the laws governing torture, proffered by Bush administration lawyers. 
In an August 1, 2002 memorandum (since repudiated by the U.S. 
government), then U.S. assistant attorney general Jay Bybee confined 
the definition of torture to only the most egregious of acts, producing 
lasting psychological damage such as post-traumatic stress syndrome or 
physical pain of an “intensity akin to that which accompanies serious 
physical injury such as death or organ failure”.139 “Because the acts 
inflicting torture are extreme”, wrote Bybee, “there is a significant range 
of acts that though they might constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment fail to rise to the level of torture.”140 The Bush 
administration further urged that international cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment standards did not extend to the treatment by U.S. 
personnel of foreign nationals overseas.141 This position has also been 
repudiated, this time by Congress in the Detainee Protection Act of 
2005.142  
Even so, in the United States’ controversial military commission 
system, information obtained by harsh methods short of torture may be 
admissible, if adjudged reliable and of sufficient probative value and its 
admission would be in the interest of justice. For the period prior to the 
enactment of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (December 30, 2005), 
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this potentially admissible information includes that obtained through 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.143 
(b) Coerced Information as Evidence 
(i) Admissibility of Torture Information 
In Canada, it is abundantly clear that information generated through 
torture is inadmissible in judicial proceedings. First, torture is strictly 
prohibited in international law. The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights144 provides in article 7 that “no one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. 
Under the ICCPR, torture (and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 
and punishment) are among the rights for which no derogation is 
permitted, even in times of emergency that threaten the life of the 
nation.145 The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment146 replicates this prohibition in 
more detailed form.  
Further, that same U.N. Torture Convention provides in article 15 
that “each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is 
established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked 
as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of 
torture as evidence that the statement was made”. This is a sweeping 
prohibition. As the United Kingdom House of Lords ruled in A v. 
Secretary of State, the article “cannot possibly be read … as intended to 
apply only in criminal proceedings. Nor can it be understood to 
differentiate between confessions and accusatory statements, or to apply 
only where the state in whose jurisdiction the proceedings are held has 
inflicted or been complicit in the torture.”147 
For its part, section 7 of the Charter protects against deprivation of 
life, liberty and security of the person in violation of “fundamental 
justice”. Section 11(d), meanwhile, guarantees those accused of an 
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offence a “fair” trial. In Hape, the Supreme Court signalled clearly that 
torture evidence would violate these constitutional standards:  
The circumstances in which the evidence was gathered must be 
considered in their entirety to determine whether admission of the 
evidence would render a Canadian trial unfair. The way in which the 
evidence was obtained may make it unreliable, as would be true of 
conscriptive evidence, for example. The evidence may have been 
gathered through means, such as torture, that are contrary to 
fundamental Charter values. Such abusive conduct would taint the 
fairness of any trial in which the evidence was admitted.148  
Moreover, use of evidence obtained by torture is expressly 
prohibited under Canada’s criminal law. Section 269.1 of the Criminal 
Code implements Canada’s obligations under the Torture Convention 
and prohibits the use of torture evidence in Canada. This bar should 
apply regardless of whether the torture evidence was obtained in Canada 
or overseas, an approach adopted in India v. Singh, a decision of the 
B.C. Supreme Court applying section 269.1’s evidentiary rule.149  
(ii)  Information Produced by Techniques Short of Torture  
The absolute bar on torture and its use in producing information 
deployed in legal proceedings is indisputable. The rules for coercion 
short of torture are more complex. 
(A) COMMON LAW 
In the Canadian law of evidence, coerced information of whatever 
sort is generally inadmissible. At common law, for instance, the courts 
have developed a “confessions rule” designed to minimize the prospect 
of false confessions by seeking to ensure that a confession is 
voluntary.150 Interrogation tactics violating this rule will render a 
confession inadmissible. Such techniques include “outright violence”151 
and “imminent threats of torture”,152 the suggestion of leniency from the 
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authorities and courts in exchange for an admission,153 or other threats or 
inducements of a sort that “raise a reasonable doubt about whether the 
will of the subject has been overborne”.154  
Oppressive conduct may also violate the common law standard, 
including “depriving the suspect of food, clothing, water, sleep, or 
medical attention; denying access to counsel; … excessively aggressive, 
intimidating questioning for a prolonged period of time” and possibly 
use by the police of false evidence to induce a confession.155 Likewise, 
police trickery substantial enough to “shock the conscience of the 
community” may trigger application of the confessions rule.156 
(B) SECURITY CERTIFICATE STANDARD 
Notably, however, between 2002 and 2008, the security certificate 
regime permitted the judge to “receive into evidence anything that, in the 
opinion of the judge, is appropriate, even if it is inadmissible in a court 
of law, and may base the decision on that evidence”.157 The net effect of 
this provision was to negate common law rules of evidence, potentially 
replacing well-understood rules of evidence with the more ambiguous 
standing of “appropriate”.  
Nevertheless, a suspicion in IRPA proceedings that intelligence was 
generated by torture should have triggered consideration of section 269.1 
or at least an assessment of reliability. Federal Courts seem to have 
adopted the latter approach, declining to give weight to evidence 
obtained via torture.158 Less certain is the approach that would be taken 
for actions, that while not torture, are also precluded by international 
law; specifically, information that is the product of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment (“CID treatment”).  
In its original iteration, Bill C-3 indicated that information could 
only be used in security certificate proceedings if “reliable” in addition 
to being appropriate. The House of Commons Standing Committee on 
Public Safety and National Security opted to amplify whatever 
guarantees this language might provide by specifying that reliable 
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information could not include information believed “on reasonable 
grounds to have been obtained as a result of the use of torture within the 
meaning of section 269.1 of the Criminal Code, or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment within the meaning of the 
Convention Against Torture”. 
(C)  MEANING OF CID TREATMENT 
A key question will now be what CID treatment is “within the 
meaning of the Convention Against Torture” — that is, the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.159 That Convention specifies that  
… each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its 
jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1, 
when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity.160 
In practice, CID treatment is commonly viewed as egregious 
treatment that falls short of outright torture.161 However, it is not defined 
in the Torture Convention, and no clear standard determines how 
outrageous this conduct must be to constitute CID treatment. The U.N. 
General Assembly has urged that the term be “interpreted so as to extend 
the widest possible protection against abuses, whether physical or 
mental”.162 For its part, the U.N. Human Rights Committee — the treaty 
body established by the ICCPR — has declined to “draw up a list of 
prohibited acts or to establish sharp distinctions between the different 
kinds of punishment or treatment [barred by Article 7 of the ICCPR]; the 
distinctions depend on the nature, purpose and severity of the treatment 
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applied”.163 It has further observed that “what constitutes inhuman or 
degrading treatment falling within the meaning of Article 7 depends on 
all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration and manner of the 
treatment, its physical or mental effects as well as the sex, age and state 
of health of the victim”.164  
In at least one instance, the committee has accepted that the rationale 
for the treatment may be relevant in determining its legal character. In a 
case against Australia, it held that a state’s legitimate fear of the flight 
risk posed by prisoners warranted the shackling of those individuals and 
rendered this act something other than CID treatment.165 The committee 
has been reluctant, however, to take this line of reasoning too far. It 
appears, therefore, to reject state justifications for certain forms of 
treatment, including corporal punishment,166 a state action the committee 
readily declares to be CID treatment.167 It has also indicated that where 
an act does, in fact, constitute CID treatment, no justification exonerates 
the injuring state. As noted, there is no derogation from article 7 even in 
times of national emergencies, presumably the most potent public 
interest motivation imaginable.168  
Despite an unwillingness to define ex ante the exact contours of the 
CID treatment standard, both the Human Rights Committee and its 
counterpart under the Torture Convention — the U.N. Committee 
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Against Torture — have identified specific state practices they view as 
constituting CID treatment. For instance, the particular acts declared 
CID treatment by the Committee Against Torture include: 
 substandard detention facilities lacking basic amenities such as 
water, electricity and heating in cold temperatures;169  
 long periods of pre-trial detention and delays in judicial procedure 
coupled with incarceration in facilities ill equipped for prolonged 
detention;170 
 beating prisoners who are also denied medical treatment and are 
deprived of food and proper places of detention;171 
 virtual isolation of detainees for a period of a year;172 
 use of electro-shock belts and restraint chairs as means of 
constraint;173 
 acts of police brutality that may lead to serious injury or death;174 and 
 deliberate torching of houses.175 
Commenting specifically on interrogation techniques, the committee 
has also identified the following as CID treatment: “(1) restraining in 
very painful conditions, (2) hooding under special conditions, (3) 
sounding of loud music for prolonged periods, (4) sleep deprivation for 
prolonged periods, (5) threats, including death threats, (6) violent 
shaking, and (7) using cold air to chill”.176 The committee’s list is 
roughly analogous to similar lists of techniques found to be inhuman and 
degrading by the European Court of Human Rights under the European 
Convention on Human Rights177 and improper by the Israeli Supreme 
Court.178 
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Specific acts identified by the Human Rights Committee as 
constituting CID treatment do not differ greatly from those invoked by 
the Committee Against Torture. They include abduction of an individual 
and then detention without contact with family members;179 denial of 
food and water;180 denial of medical assistance after ill-treatment;181 death 
threats;182 mock executions;183 whipping and corporal punishment;184 
failure to notify a family of the fate of an executed prisoner;185 prolonged 
detention on death row when coupled with “further compelling 
circumstances relating to the detention”;186 and detention in substandard 
facilities187 or conditions.188 Examples of CID treatment stemming from 
the conditions of detention include: 
 incarceration for 50 hours in an overcrowded facility, resulting in 
prisoners being soiled with excrement, coupled with denial of food 
and water for a day;189 
 incarceration in circumstances falling below the standards set in the 
U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,190 
coupled with detention incommunicado, death and torture threats, 
deprivation of food and water and denial of recreational relief;191 
 solitary incarceration for 10 years in a tiny cell, with minimal 
recreational opportunities;192 
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 solitary incarceration incommunicado for various periods;193 and 
 incarceration with limited recreational opportunities, no mattress or 
bedding, no adequate sanitation, ventilation or electric lighting, and 
denial of exercise, medical treatment, nutrition and clean drinking 
water.194 
(iii) Reasonable Grounds Standard 
If the description of interrogation techniques used by the United 
States and other countries discussed above is any indication, a 
substantial amount of information stemming from these sources should 
be excluded from security certificate proceedings on the basis, at the 
very least, of the CID treatment standard. There need not be any debate, 
for example, as to whether waterboarding is torture, a bizarre 
controversy that has arisen in the United States recently. Even if it is not, 
it is certainly CID treatment. 
In the past, an issue has arisen as to which party bears the burden of 
proof in demonstrating the methods via which the information was 
produced.195 The onus and burden of proof issue is simplified in the Bill 
C-3 context by two variables. First, unlike in other cases in which named 
persons not privy to the information used against then are asked to make 
the case that that information is the product of coercive interrogation, the 
special advocate in security certificate cases will (hopefully) be in a 
reasonable position to query and challenge the provenance of 
information deployed by the government. In this circumstance, asking 
the special advocate to bear the onus may not be unusually onerous. This 
conclusion does not, of course, apply where the special advocate is given 
access to only the most processed information, the provenance of which 
is unclear. In these circumstances, courts should be very demanding of 
the government and insist that information on the source of the data be 
provided. 
Second, the threshold of proof articulated in Bill C-3 is belief on 
reasonable grounds. Almost identical language appears elsewhere in the 
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IRPA, not least in the provisions discussed further below allowing a 
named person to be detained on “reasonable grounds to believe” that 
they are a security risk. This same language was part of the IRPA under 
the pre-Bill C-3 regime for security certificate detentions, as well as 
many other immigration-related matters. Assessing its meaning in 
Charkaoui, the Supreme Court has concluded that such a belief depends 
on whether “there is an objective basis [that the person is a danger] … 
which is based on compelling and credible information”.196 It has 
repeated this observation in relation to other IRPA provisions using the 
same language.197 Notably, this is a standard that falls short of the civil 
balance of probabilities standard.198 
Since reasonable grounds to believe is prescribed in relation to the 
exclusion of torture and CID treatment information, the only plausible 
interpretation is that, to make out grounds for excluding this information, 
the named person or the special advocate will have to justify their case 
on an objective basis, based on compelling and credible information. 
They will not, however, be obliged to prove their case on a balance of 
probabilities, creating a potentially expansive scope for exclusions. 
2. Missed Opportunities 
While the inclusion of CID treatment language can be regarded as an 
improvement, Bill C-3 failed to address other concerns. First, Bill C-3 
persists in applying stricter controls on disclosure to named persons than 
would be applied in other Canadian judicial proceedings. Second, Bill C-3 
did not cure provisions in the IRPA that allow the government to remove 
named persons to torture. Third, Bill C-3 reinforced the likelihood that 
security certificates will evolve into a system of indefinite constraints on 
liberty for foreigners more stringent than anything applicable to Canadian 
citizens. 
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(a)  Disclosure to the Named Person 
In Charkaoui, the Supreme Court clearly concluded that the 
limitations on disclosure to the named person violated section 7 of the 
Charter. Special advocates might save the procedure under section 1, but 
there should be no misapprehension that they restore a fair hearing — as 
noted, their capacity to rebut government cases can never be as full as 
would counsel fully able to discuss the government’s complete case with 
their client. Accordingly, a core priority will continue to be the fullest 
possible disclosure of information to the named person. On this issue, 
Bill C-3 falls short of standards developed in Canadian law in other 
contexts and what may be the emerging practice in the United Kingdom.  
The IRPA now provides that throughout the security certificate 
proceeding, “the judge shall ensure that the permanent resident or 
foreign national is provided with a summary of information and other 
evidence that enables them to be reasonably informed of the case made 
by the Minister in the proceeding but that does not include anything that, 
in the judge’s opinion, would be injurious to national security or 
endanger the safety of any person if disclosed”.199 
This disclosure regime under the immigration law is quite different 
from the more general system for protecting national security 
confidentiality created by section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act.200 In 
the Canada Evidence Act, the judge is able to balance the national 
security interest against other interests, including the public interest in a 
fair proceeding. Put another way, if the national security implications of 
releasing the information is outweighed by the fair hearing interest, the 
judge may order disclosure. 
This balancing approach may well be adopted in the United 
Kingdom in the wake of the House of Lords’ recent decision of 
Secretary of State v. MB.201 In that decision, the House of Lords 
examined the compatibility of the U.K. system of “control orders” — 
limitations on liberty imposed on the basis that a person is suspected of 
posing a terrorist threat — with the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Control orders proceedings include the use of secret evidence 
and special advocates. While generally comfortable with the special 
advocate approach to reconciling bona fide needs for secrecy with 
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fairness, the House of Lords noted that there were limits on the extent 
that special advocates could resuscitate fair trial rights. Although 
somewhat less than emphatic on this point, the law lords reasoning 
suggests that a residual discretion should rest with the judge to determine 
whether the level of disclosure to the named person was sufficient to 
meet fair trial standards. Where the proceeding falls short of a fair 
hearing, the matter might come to an end, unless the government is 
prepared to make fuller disclosure.  
Bill C-3 might usefully have incorporated this balancing approach. 
This balancing would allow the judge to permit disclosure if the damage 
to the national security from disclosure was relatively small but the 
importance of the disclosure of the evidence to the fairness of the 
proceeding was very high. 
(b)  Indefinite Detention or Other Limits on Liberty 
Even a special advocate and disclosure model that met all of the 
objections and addressed all the concerns set out above would not cure 
certain fundamental difficulties with the present IRPA system. The 
IRPA permits deprivations of liberty on a standard slightly more 
demanding than suspicion. As noted, the information offered by the 
government in support of the reasonableness of a security certificate is 
assessed on the basis of a “reasonable ground to believe” standard, a 
threshold much lower than the accepted criminal or civil law standards 
of proof. Further, a person may be removed to face persecution where 
the government considers the security risk presented by that person so 
justifies, and these decisions are reviewed by courts applying highly 
deferential standards of review.202 
Taken together, this regime imposes relatively undemanding burdens 
on a government committed to restricting liberty for prolonged — and 
potentially indefinite — periods, pending deportation which may result 
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in torture or maltreatment far in excess of anything that could be 
imposed under Canadian law.  
In this respect, Bill C-3 does nothing to change the prior security 
certificate regime. It does, however, add structure to what may become a 
system of indefinite detention (or other, significant constraints on 
liberty) for foreign nationals. This last section examines this contention, 
looking first at the question of removal to torture and then detention. 
(i)  Removal to Torture 
Canada appears to be unique among Western states in anticipating in 
its statute books removal to torture if the security threats are significant 
enough. Under the security certificate process, where the judge views the 
certificate as reasonable, the judge’s decision constitutes a removal 
order.203 However, this process may be complemented (for non-refugees) 
with a “pre-removal risk assessment process”. Specifically, the Act 
provides that non-refugees subject to a security certificate may be 
protected from removal if the risk of torture or cruel and unusual 
treatment is more significant, in the eyes of the government, than the 
danger that person presents to the security of Canada.204 A similar 
protection is available to refugees subject to security certificates. 
Pursuant to section 115 of the Act, a refugee may be removed even 
where they are at risk of torture where the person constitutes a danger to 
the security of Canada. However, the security risk must be properly 
balanced against the risk of maltreatment.205 
As these provisions suggest, the risk of torture is not an absolute bar 
on removal, but instead a limitation on deportations that can be 
overcome in the interest of national security.  
Canada’s preparedness to remove persons to torture has generated 
negative international commentary.206 It is also unquestionably contrary 
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to international law. Certainly, a terrorist is not entitled to refugee status 
under international refugee law.207 Like every other person, however, 
such an individual may not be expelled, returned (“refouler”) or 
extradited “to another State where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture”.208 In 
assessing these substantial grounds, governments are to “take into 
account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the 
existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant 
or mass violations of human rights”.209 
These obligations — contained in the U.N. Torture Convention — 
exist also by virtue of the ICCPR. As noted, that instrument bars torture 
and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment.210 The 
U.N. Human Rights Committee has interpreted this prohibition to apply 
to deportation proceedings: “States parties must not expose individuals 
to the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment upon return to another country by way of their extradition, 
expulsion or refoulement.”211 
Where substantial grounds to believe torture will occur exist, the bar 
on removal to torture is absolute and is subject to no derogation. 
However, states — including Canada — have sometimes sought to 
justify removals to countries with notorious torture records on the 
grounds that the prospect of torture is vitiated by “diplomatic 
assurances”; that is, pledges provided by states that they will not torture 
the individual. These assurances — intended to guard against an 
eventuality that is almost always illegal in these states, and yet occurs on 
a sometimes vast scale — have been roundly condemned by human 
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rights organizations as ineffective.212 The Supreme Court of Canada has 
also queried their utility in Suresh.213 
In Suresh, however, the Supreme Court created substantial 
uncertainty as to whether Canada’s international obligations under the 
Torture Convention and the ICCPR were also part of Canadian 
constitutional law. In that case, the Supreme Court applied section 7 of 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and held that “insofar as the 
Immigration Act leaves open the possibility of deportation to torture, 
the Minister should generally decline to deport refugees where on the 
evidence there is a substantial risk of torture”.214 However, the Court 
qualified its holding by refusing to “exclude the possibility that in 
exceptional circumstances, deportation to face torture might be justified, 
either as a consequence of the balancing process mandated by s. 7 of the 
Charter or under s. 1” in exceptional conditions “such as natural 
disasters, the outbreak of war, epidemics and the like”.215 Exactly what 
constitutes these exceptional circumstances remained unclear at the time 
of this writing.216  
Unquestionably, however, the “exceptional circumstances” language 
employed by the Supreme Court in Suresh is a fragile basis on which to 
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build Canada’s national security deportation law. Deportation to torture 
will also certainly be revisited by the Supreme Court in the foreseeable 
future. Indeed, recent jurisprudence from the Supreme Court has stressed 
that, in interpreting the Charter, “courts should seek to ensure 
compliance with Canada’s binding obligations under international law 
where the express words are capable of supporting such a 
construction”.217 Since the words of the Charter are more than capable of 
being read consistently with the Torture Convention, it seems unlikely 
the Suresh exception can survive close application of this interpretive 
rule. 
The senate special committee on anti-terrorism law recommended in 
2007 that the IRPA be amended to bar emphatically removal where there 
are “reasonable grounds to believe the individual will be subject to 
torture in the country to which he or she will be removed”.218 Bill C-3 
failed to do this, leaving intact a Canadian statute book that cannot be 
reconciled with Canada’s international obligations. 
(ii)  Detention or Other Limitations on Liberty 
(A) DETENTION SYSTEM UNDER SECURITY CERTIFICATES 
Once the ministers issue a security certificate, named persons may 
be held in detention on national security grounds pursuant to a warrant.219 
The ministers may issue this warrant where they have “reasonable 
grounds to believe that the permanent resident is a danger to national 
security”, among other things.220 The detention of a named person is 
reviewed by a special designated judge of the Federal Court within 48 
hours. In this review, the court will order that the detention be continued 
if the judge is “satisfied” that the named person’s release (on conditions, 
in the new law) would, among other things, be injurious to national 
security.221 If the judge is so satisfied, the matter is revisited every six 
months. The reference to “satisfied” could be construed as obliging 
fairly searching judicial consideration of the detention order. However, 
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because the original ministerial detention warrant is based on a 
“reasonable grounds the belief” the Supreme Court has concluded that 
court reviews of the detention should also be based on this standard; that 
is, a judge is to consider whether “there is an objective basis [that the 
person is a danger] … which is based on compelling and credible 
information”.222  
In practice, this detention can be prolonged. In part because 
individuals have resisted deportation to states that may torture them, the 
men subject to security certificates at the time of this writing spent (or 
continue to spend) lengthy periods incarcerated: by the beginning of 
2007, the average period of detention for the men still imprisoned at that 
time was almost six years.223 This is a period of detention longer than the 
average sentence for convicted attempted murderers in Canada.224 
(B)  CONDITIONAL RELEASE 
In the years before Bill C-3, the Federal Court demonstrated an 
unease (expressed in practice, if not in prose) with prolonged security-
certificate detention. For instance, in Charkaoui, the Federal Court judge 
acknowledged that factual circumstances change with the passage of 
time, influencing how the court would assess the need for continued 
detention. In that case, the prolonged period of detention, coupled with 
the notoriety of the case, “neutralized” the security threat, prompting the 
judge to order Charkaoui’s release on conditions, pending the outcome 
of the removal proceedings.225 Similarly, a second detainee, Mohamed 
Harkat, was released by the Federal Court, on strict conditions in 2006.226 
Two other men, Mohammad Mahjoub and Mahmoud Jaballah, were 
released in similar circumstances in early 2007.227 
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This practice of judicial release on strict conditions was endorsed by 
the Supreme Court in Charkaoui, and indeed was the feature of the 
security certificate system that preserved it from being declared cruel 
and unusual treatment in violation of the Charter.228 The Court concluded 
that “extended periods of detention under the certificate provisions of the 
IRPA do not violate ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter if accompanied by a 
process that provides regular opportunities for review of detention, 
taking into account all relevant factors” including: reasons for the 
detention; length of the detention; reasons for the delay of deportation; 
anticipated future length of detention; and the availability of alternatives 
to detention.229 
It must be recognized, however, that the conditions that have been 
imposed to secure release are very aggressive. For example, the order to 
which Harkat was subjected upon conditional release required that he 
not have access to a room with an Internet-equipped computer. Violation 
of this or any other condition was, according to the release agreement, 
“an offence within the meaning of section 127 of the Criminal Code and 
shall constitute an offence pursuant to paragraph 124(1)(a) of the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act”.230  
While perhaps justifiable in their own right, it is notable that strict 
release conditions allow the state to impose a different code of conduct 
on suspected security risks than exists under the regular law. Where 
these closely monitored persons violate the terms of release, the latter 
may amount to a hair-trigger converting immigration detention into 
incarceration for criminal offences. 
(C)  BILL C-3 AND INDEFINITE LIMITATIONS ON LIBERTY FOR 
FOREIGNERS 
Bill C-3 codifies, without truly altering, prior practice on detention 
and conditional release. It formalizes a graduated form of constraints on 
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liberty: detention is to be continued only if a judge is satisfied that 
conditional release does not adequately protect, inter alia, national 
security.231 It also creates formal statutory authority for conditional 
release, authorizes a court to adjust those release orders in various 
circumstances (including “because of a material change in the 
circumstances that led to the order”)232 and allows a named person to be 
arrested by a peace officer where the latter has reasonable grounds to 
believe the release order has been breached.233 
ABSENCE OF A “BURDEN ESCALATOR” 
The law does not, however, query whether prolonged limitations on 
liberty truly are acceptable on the reasonable grounds to believe 
standard. In the view of these authors, a “reasonable ground to believe” 
standard of proof may be proper for an initial detention. However, as the 
duration of detention or other limits on liberty increase, the government 
should bear an escalating burden. Escalating burdens will have the effect 
of obliging fuller government disclosure — it must show more to make 
out its case. It would also not prejudice the government’s ability to 
respond quickly since an initial security certificate could be issued or a 
detention ordered on the lesser standard. Only as the detention endured 
would the burden on the government escalate. 
TOWARDS A SYSTEM OF LIMITATIONS ON LIBERTY FOR FOREIGNERS 
Moreover, the law is entirely silent on whether detention or other 
constraints on liberty may persist under this regime if the detainee is no 
longer subject to viable removal proceedings. This is an important 
omission. It may well be that a named person will not be removed 
because, on the balancing mandated by the IRPA described above, the 
persecution threat (including of torture) to the person if removed 
outweighs the threat to national security posed by the person or because 
section 7 of the Charter bars their removal to persecution and/or torture.  
During the legislative process, the government suggested that the 
absence of an existing deportation process will be a variable the Federal 
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Court considers in deciding whether to continue a detention or not.234 
While that seems likely, nothing in the law brings to an end detention or 
other constraints on liberty under the security certificate process where 
deportations fail. The letter of the law suggests that this detention or 
highly constrained release could continue indefinitely if there remain 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person is a danger to national 
security. 
There are two possible responses to this prospect. First, the Federal 
Court (or on appeal, a higher court) might conclude that while there is no 
firm link in the law between detention and a viable removal process, the 
absence of such removal proceedings is the sort of “material change in 
circumstance” that justifies a modification (and relaxation) of the release 
order. The difficulty with this approach is that modification does not 
mean elimination — the security certificate process anticipates either 
detention or conditional release, not full release. 
Second, the courts may simply adjudge unconstitutional a system 
that allows for the stand-alone detention or limited release of foreigners 
on the basis of mere reasonable beliefs, demonstrated by mostly secret 
evidence. Detention or limited release pending removal is one thing; 
indefinite detention unconnected to removals, even if housed under the 
immigration law, would be quite another.  
One matter likely to be raised in such a constitutional challenge is 
the equality guarantees of section 15 of the Charter. In Charkaoui, the 
Supreme Court gave short shrift to equality-based objections to the 
security certificate system, largely because “the detentions at issue have 
become unhinged from the state’s purpose of deportation”.235 If that de-
hinging were, however, to arise, the section 15 equality guarantee issues 
would be ripe for consideration.  
On that issue, unquestionably, the system of detention or limited 
release under security certificates is far more draconian than anything 
that might be imposed on Canadian citizens. In relation to the latter, the 
closest analogy would be recognizance on conditions provisions in the 
Criminal Code.236  
Under section 810.01, for instance, a person “who fears on 
reasonable grounds that another person will commit … a terrorism 
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offence may, with the consent of the Attorney General, lay an 
information before a provincial court judge”. If the provincial court 
judge is persuaded that these reasonable grounds for the fear exist, he or 
she may order the defendant to “enter into a recognizance to keep the 
peace and be of good behaviour” for up to 12 months, and may impose 
other reasonable conditions. A refusal by the accused to enter into the 
recognizance is punishable by imprisonment for up to 12 months. A 
breach of a recognizance is a criminal offence, punishable by up to two 
years imprisonment if a conviction is secured on indictment.237 
These recognizances — or “peace bonds” — differ from the IRPA 
process in two key respects, however. First, while the limitations on 
liberty under peace bonds could be extensive, they cannot be as 
extensive as those under the IRPA. In R. v. Budreo,238 the Ontario Court 
of Appeal agreed that a peace bond (in that case, one guarding against 
sex offences directed at minors) amounts to a restraint on liberty, and 
thus triggered the application of section 7 of the Charter. It concluded, 
however, that fundamental justice was not offended where the provision 
was largely geared to bona fide prevention and was not truly penal in 
nature. Part of that reasoning appears to rest on the fact that the peace 
bond was reasonably narrowly tailored, restricting the defendant’s 
liberty in respect to a large, but reasonably discrete group of persons 
(minors).239 In rejecting the defendant’s supplemental argument that the 
constraints imposed by peace bond were overbroad, the court noted the 
reasonably narrow scope of the restrictions, underscoring that their 
limited focus permitted “a defendant to lead a reasonably normal life”.240 
It is also notable that the Budreo court suggested a definite outer limit on 
the scope of a peace bond: “detention or imprisonment under a provision 
that does not charge an offence would be an unacceptable restriction on a 
defendant’s liberty and would be contrary to the principles of 
fundamental justice”.241 This language suggests that, at the very least, no 
Canadian could be detained for any serious length of time on national 
security suspicions. 
Second, unlike the IRPA process, peace bond questions are 
adjudicated in open court — there is no specific provision that would 
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allow the use of secret evidence, and any effort to withhold relevant 
information from the named person would presumably be considered 
under the Canada Evidence Act balancing test discussed above.242 That 
same Act empowers the criminal court judge to dismiss proceedings in 
circumstances where the government succeeds in denying a person 
access to information necessary for a fair trial.243 Put another way, the 
procedural guarantees in the criminal context are more robust that those 
that are afforded foreigners under the IRPA. 
Under these circumstances, an equality challenge to the security 
certificate regime seems plausible — perhaps even incontrovertible.  
THE SLIPPERY SLOPE 
If our courts were to arrive at this conclusion, we would find 
ourselves where the United Kingdom was in 2004. In December 2004 
the House of Lords declared indefinite detention of foreign terrorist 
suspects without trial under immigration law contrary to U.K. human 
rights obligations.244 In the words of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, 
“indefinite imprisonment without charge or trial is anathema in any 
country which observes the rule of law”.245 The decision turned, in part, 
on the law lords’ conclusion that there was no reason to presume that 
foreign nationals (as opposed to U.K. nationals) presented the greatest 
national security threat. 
In response to this decision, the U.K. Parliament enacted the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 permitting the imposition of “control 
orders” directed at the activities of both foreign and U.K. nationals 
suspected of terrorist activity.246 As noted above, these control orders 
permit stringent limitations on liberty, on the basis of secret information. 
Bill C-3, by failing to address the prospects of indefinite detention 
frankly, potentially creates a slide towards the U.K. outcome, in slow 
motion. A preferable course of action would have placed a clear outer 
limit on limitations on liberty under the IRPA; a point where, with no 
reasonable prospect of deportation, the fate of the named person must be 
adjudicated under the standard Criminal Code process, if at all. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
When these authors spoke to over a dozen United Kingdom (and 
New Zealand) special advocates in the summer of 2007, some of these 
experienced barristers expressed the hope that the anticipated Canadian 
response to Charkaoui would come in the form of a robust special 
counsel model that would overcome the problems experienced in their 
jurisdictions. As one put it, a Canadian “Cadillac” model would increase 
pressure on their own governments to improve their systems. 
In fact, Parliament could have enacted a system that affirmatively 
permitted carefully controlled continued dialogue between special 
advocate and named person, affirmed and guaranteed full disclosure of 
all relevant information to the court and special advocate, limited 
detention or other constraints on liberty to periods in which deportation 
was a possibility, and closed the door on removal to torture, among other 
things. All of these proposals were before Parliament and parliamentary 
committees, even before Bill C-3 was tabled. Indeed, several had been 
endorsed by parliamentary committees in their just-concluded reviews of 
Canada’s anti-terrorism laws. 
Unfortunately, Bill C-3 charted a very different course, abandoning 
features of Canada’s indigenous SIRC system that side-stepped 
problems experienced in other jurisdictions and importing, almost holus 
bolus, the U.K. approach. There was no advance consultation by 
government on this approach, despite acute interest in security 
certificates. The bill was tabled in the tenth, if not eleventh, hour before 
the expiry of the Charkaoui deadline. It wallowed for weeks in the 
Commons, and was rammed through a (properly) unhappy Senate. The 
political atmosphere was tainted with hallway mutterings of confidence 
votes and finger-pointing if persons characterized by the government as 
dangerous terrorists were left free to roam the country.  
Bill C-3 has skated as close as it could to the constitutional line 
drawn by the Supreme Court. It will now incite another round of 
constitutional litigation asking the Court to define exactly where that line 
is. At the same time, Bill C-3 makes no effort to forestall inevitable 
supplemental constitutional issues surrounding detention and removal to 
torture. Constitutional “dialogue” will take the form of an inter-branch 
ping-pong.  
This back and forth may be characterized as healthy democratic 
evolution; a constitutional chat that looks grand from the court room, 
class room or parliamentary chamber. It is certainly less attractive to the 
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five individuals currently in long-term detention or subject to extremely 
strict limitations on liberty, each of whom is facing removal to possible 
torture. For these people, as for others involved in the process, Bill C-3 
was a trip to Bismarck’s sausage factory. 
